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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 003344

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SUBJECT: A/S HILL'S MEETING WITH INDONESIAN PRESIDENT
YUDHOYONO MARCH 3

Classified By: AMBASSADOR B. LYNN PASCOE. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

¶1. (C) Summary: Indonesian President Yudhoyono March 3 described to EAP Assistant Secretary Chris Hill his plans to press the Burmese junta to reform. During his visit to Rangoon March 2, the President said he had urged General Than Shwe to make progress on the national constitution, national reconciliation and democracy. Yudhoyono said that the Burmese leadership had three major fears: its safety; "uncontrolled revenge" if a change in government occurs; and conflict among the country's tribes. As a consequence, the international community should stress, in addition to fulfillment of the roadmap, national reconciliation and maintenance of stability and resolution of communal problems.

Yudhoyono noted that China and India's close relationship with Rangoon weakened the leverage of the international community, and said he would press the Chinese leadership to take a more constructive role. Yudhoyono welcomed the upcoming visit by the Secretary to Jakarta and the opportunity he would have to discuss with her the key issues on which the U.S. and Indonesia could cooperate, including bridging Muslim/West divisions. End Summary.

¶2. (C) Indonesian President Susilio Bambang Yudhoyono March 3 described to EAP Assistant Secretary Chris Hill his visit to Rangoon March 2, which, he explained, he had undertaken in his capacity as Indonesian President, not as an envoy of UNSGY Annan or of ASEAN. He had emphasized to General Than Shwe that Indonesia wanted to see progress on the national constitution, national reconciliation and democracy.

Drawing A Picture of the Burmese Leadership

¶3. (C) SBY noted he had met General Than Shwe once before, at the Asia-Africa Summit in Jakarta in April 2005, and Prime Minister General Soe Win three other times in Jakarta, Laos and Kuala Lumpur. During SBY's visit to Rangoon, four generals accompanied Than Shwe in the meetings. Burmese Minister of Transportation, MG Thein Swe, accompanied SBY throughout the visit and they talked at length. SBY said he could now "draw a picture" of the leadership and its concerns.

Burmese Concerns

¶4. (C) Yudhoyono said that the Burmese leadership had three major fears. First, it feared for its safety should governmental change occur in Burma. For this reason, the leadership had built the new capital Pyinmana, SBY said,

noting that he had learned that construction there would include bunkers and other fortifications "like we see in Libya." Second, the Generals fear "uncontrolled revenge" if a change in government occurs. Third, the leadership fears conflict among the country's ethnic groups.

Yudhoyono's Message to Than Shwe

¶ 15. (C) Yudhoyono said, given these three major fears, Indonesia and the international community should stress, in addition to fulfillment of the roadmap, national reconciliation, maintenance of stability and resolution of communal problems. SBY noted that Burma needed a "comprehensive solution." He added that he listened to the leadership's arguments, and noted to them that "Indonesia had experienced the same things in the past."

Evaluation of Burmese Leadership

¶ 16. (C) Yudhoyono noted that the Burmese "number two," Vice Senior General Maung Aye, was in a power struggle with Than Shwe. The number three, General Thura Shwe Mann, Chief of General Staff in the Ministry of Defense, appeared more open.

SBY said he would keep in touch with Thura Shwe Mann, since it could be possible to influence the situation through that channel.

China and India Weaken Leverage

¶ 17. (C) Yudhoyono said Indonesia would work during the next

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two to three months to influence a real change. SBY added, "to be frank," that while ASEAN pushed Burma, Rangoon was relying on its "two biggest brothers," China and India. China has three interests: access into Burma; addressing its own energy consumption needs through gas and oil; and protecting the regime from a transition to democracy. SBY said he would contact the Chinese leadership to discuss this and stress that there must be a smooth transition in Burma, adding that China "can probably guarantee the security" of the Burmese leadership.

Next Steps

¶ 18. (C) SBY is now planning next steps with his staff. He had concluded during his visit that Indonesia must continue the effort to press the Burmese leadership to implement the roadmap; include Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) as part of the national congress; seek national reconciliation; and support conference resolve. SBY repeated he would talk to India and China. He noted that Burma "hated" the United Nations, making it impossible for the UN Special Envoy to meet the leadership. This "hatred," SBY explained, resulted from perceived "unfair UN reports" and "inappropriate behavior" by UN agencies. SBY reiterated that "security" would provide a way to persuade Than Shwe. In his discussions with Than Shwe, SBY had recounted that eight years after the downfall of General Suharto he, SBY -- an elected, retired general -- had appointed three former flag officers to his cabinet without any problems and Indonesia had managed its transition from military to elected-civilian rule. He added that "there must be progress" to allow this to occur.

Aung San Suu Kyi

¶ 19. (C) A/S Hill asked if SBY had discussed ASSK. Yudhoyono explained he had not mentioned her specifically by name, but had told the leadership that he supported the idea of a national congress and hoped it could include the leader of the pro-democracy movement. A/S Hill noted that reaction in

the U.S. was very negative to the regime's continued detention of ASSK and other human rights activists.

¶10. (C) In conclusion, SBY responded that to be "realistic," two things needed doing in Burma: 1) implement the promised roadmap to democracy and include ASSK in the process; and 2) seek national reconciliation and conflict resolution. Some 100,000 rebels currently existed in Burma, he noted; if the international community told them it would support conflict resolution, the rebels would "buy it." A/S Hill asked whether the regime feared ASSK. SBY said he had not asked that question; Indonesian citizens in Burma, however, had told him they liked ASSK but doubted she could lead the country because of the potential for communal conflict.

DPRK

¶11. (C) A/S Hill noted he had spoken with Indonesia's special envoy to the DPRK Ambassador Nana Sutresna, and that he was looking for ideas. SBY remarked "everybody is." A/S Hill noted he was concerned by the situation with the DPRK. SBY said he wanted to see progress in military-to-military relations between the DPRK and ROK, and had offered to facilitate a meeting between defense ministers. The DPRK had responded that they could perhaps do so after the DPRK and ROK military representatives met. A/S Hill noted that many in Washington were losing confidence in the possibility of a negotiated solution to the nuclear issue.

The Philippines

¶12. (C) A/S Hill noted that the U.S. worried about President Arroyo's ability to remain in office. She had become extremely unpopular and was stubborn. Her plan to change the constitution to establish the position of a prime minister to augment the position of president, which would become a more ceremonial office, could possibly resolve the situation. It would be disastrous, however, if she were unseated by unconstitutional means, either through "people power" or "military power" movements. A/S Hill said the U.S. had been concerned by her imposition of a state of emergency. By

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ending the state of emergency, she had helped allay concerns of the international community. SBY said that Indonesia also faced a situation in which the legislature was not willing to help solve problems but rather focused on stopping the ongoing work of the government. A/S Hill said that the U.S. and Philippines had an important job in Mindanao. U.S. Special Forces were actively engaged to close gaps, collect intelligence and act to get some of the bad guys. This is progressing well and the U.S. did not want a governing crisis in Manila to disrupt these efforts.

CT Cooperation with Neighbors

¶13. (C) SBY said that he had asked Malaysian PM Badawi to have "real cooperation" among Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines in the Sulawesi Sea area. He had just appointed former Indonesian National Police (INP) Chief Dai Bachtiar, who had done a good job on counterterrorism while head of INP, as "special envoy" to facilitate regional CT cooperation. The biggest problem lay in Sabah, where the INP sometimes had problems cooperating with Malaysian counterparts. SBY reemphasized the importance of cross-border cooperation and the need to share intelligence. He said that PM Badawi had promised him that Malaysia could increase its cooperation with Indonesia. Ambassador Pascoe noted that U.S. Embassies in the region continued to work to find ways to increase cooperation in the region and could, in that regard, provide additional police and military training or offer other programs if Yudhoyono identified them.

Secretary Rice's Visit to Indonesia

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¶14. (C) A/S Hill noted that the Secretary was interested in the Islamic world and the confrontation with the West and would appreciate discussing this with SBY. She would also like to discuss regional issues, A/S Hill said. Yudhoyono responded he would talk to her openly about these issues. He noted that he had a good talk with the Sultan of Brunei on his just-concluded visit there and the two would do their best to develop Islam into a moderate, tolerant and peaceful religion. He said he needed to talk about this more publicly: Indonesia had a silent majority but a noisy radical minority.

Meeting with Presidential Advisor Djalal

¶15. (C) Presidential Advisor Dino Djalal provided A/S Hill additional details on Yudhoyono's visit to Burma. He noted that Indonesia had asked for a one-on-one for SBY with Than Shwe but the Burmese refused; instead, a large meeting was followed by a meeting with Than Shwe-plus-four on the Burmese side and SBY-plus-four on Indonesia side. SBY has named "dual special envoys" for Burma: Ali Alatas will be joined by Hari Sabarno, who took SBY's place as Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs when then-President Megawati fired SBY from the job.

¶16. (C) Djalal, noting that Than Shwe likes and has confidence in SBY, said that SBY had invited him to visit Indonesia. Djalal noted that Than Shwe had told SBY that "As generals we both know that militaries cannot rule forever." Djalal observed that the Junta seemed suspicious of ASEAN, and had not, for example, informed ASEAN members of plans to move the capital, which involved a great deal of corruption; China, Thailand and India are making money on the construction of the new capital.

¶17. (C) The one country with influence over the Junta is China; SBY wants to work with President Hu Jintao. Indonesia will also use the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Retreat in Bali, April 17-18, and a possible bilateral on its margins, to continue to press the junta to move on releasing ASSK. Djalal said that SBY sought to keep a personal relationship going with Than Shwe and use it to influence him. The Junta remains suspicious of the U.S., and sees it as supporting the Karen National Union (KNU). Djalal suggested a combination of a hard U.S. stance and Indonesia's softer persuasion might prove effective.

¶18. (U) This cable was cleared by A/S Hill.
PASCOE